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5

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

EDGAR JEFFRIES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20080009-CA

:

The Utah legislature has promulgated two separate acts making it unlawful to
distribute a simulated controlled substance. The first act defines the substance as a
counterfeit and makes the offense a felony. The second defines the substance as an
imitation and makes the offense a misdemeanor. In this case, the State alleged that
Appellant Edgar Jeffries sold sheetrock as cocaine, and it charged him under the felony
provisions for counterfeit substances. The trial court upheld the charge. That was error.
Jeffries has sought to distinguish between the counterfeit and imitation provisions.
He maintains the imitation provisions apply to substances like baking soda, pesticide and
sheetrock that are made to resemble illicit controlled substances, and he has cited to cases
for that application. (See, e.g., Br. of Appellant, 15-17). On the other hand, the counterfeit provisions apply to substances that bear more than a resemblance to a controlled substance. (See, e.g.* id., 8-14). They apply to altered pharmaceutical substances and the
like, which are represented to be bona fide controlled substances and meant to be used by
consumers as such. (See, e.g., id.); see also Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (2007).
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In its brief, the State has focused on counterfeit substances and the dangers they
present. (See Br. of Appellee, 13-14). Jeffries does not dispute the dangers. Indeed,
counterfeits are presented as authentic. Consequently, they may be as hazardous as real
drugs since they may contain unknown contaminants or impurities. In that regard, to the
extent the State's brief offers any distinction between counterfeit and imitation
substances, it is that counterfeits present society with the same risks and dangers as real
drugs. (See, e.g., Br. of Appellee, 13-14). And Utah law treats counterfeit and controlled
substances the same. See. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1).
Notably, an imitation substance - which specifically does not include a "controlled
substance" or a "counterfeit controlled substance" - resembles a controlled substance and
does not present the same risks or perils as actual drugs. Sheetrock and baking soda
qualify as an imitation. They are not controlled or counterfeit controlled substances.
They are benign. Nevertheless, distribution even of a benign substance is a step in illegal
trafficking, and in Utah, such distribution is a misdemeanor offense. Utah Code Ann. §§
58-37b-l to -8 (2007). Based on those distinctions, the substance at issue here, sheetrock
packaged to resemble cocaine, constituted an imitation substance. Jeffries was entitled to
have the case proceed under the misdemeanor imitation provisions.
In the alternative, in the event this Court is not compelled by the distinction between counterfeits and imitations, Jeffries nevertheless is entitled to have the case proceed
under the misdemeanor provisions. State v. ShondeU 453 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1969)
(stating doubt or uncertainty as to which of two punishments is applicable entitles
defendant to the benefit of the lesser). Under Utah law, criminal statutes must contain
2 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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significant differences "so that the exact same conduct is not subject to different penalties
depending upon which of two statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to charge." State v.
Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985) (stating lack of significant distinction gives a
prosecutor "impermissible discretion to choose a defendant's penalty based upon which
statute the prosecutor chooses to charge"). The State does not dispute the law. (See Br.
of Appellee, 35-39). On that basis, this Court may apply the Shondel doctrine and order
that the case proceed under the misdemeanor provisions.
ARGUMENT
THE STATE WAS REQUIRED TO PROCEED WITH THIS CASE UNDER
THE PROVISIONS FOR IMITATION SUBSTANCES.
A. THE TOOLS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT THE
DETERMINATION THAT SHEETROCK IS AN IMITATION SUBSTANCE.
This case concerns two separate acts in the criminal code: the counterfeit
provisions in the Controlled Substances Act, and the Imitation Controlled Substances
Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-2, 58-37-8 (2007) (the Controlled Substances Act);
id at §§ 58-37b-l to -8 (2007) (the Imitation Controlled Substances Act). Both acts
criminalize distribution of a simulated substance. (Brief of Appellee, 35-36 (identifying
elements under each act)). The counterfeit provisions make the offense a second degree
felony and the imitation provisions make it a misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1) (identifying felony); id_ at § 58-37b-4 (identifying misdemeanor).
In this case, Jeffries provided a package of sheetrock in response to an undercover
officer's request for "rock." (See R. 57-59). The officer testified that the package
resembled a $20 dosage of crack cocaine in appearance. (Br. of Appellee, 3); (R. 58-59).
3
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Contrary to the State's claims, Jeffries maintains the felony counterfeit provisions are
inapplicable to distribution of that substance. (See Br. of Appellee, 9 (incorrectly stating
Jeffries's position)). Jeffries has relied on the tools of statutory construction to interpret
the counterfeit provisions and the imitation provisions. (Br. of Appellant, Argument A.)
He has relied on the plain language of the relevant statutes, the ordinary meaning
of statutory terms, definitional provisions, and the principle that the legislature has used
terms in each act advisedly. (M, 6-13 (citations omitted)). He has relied on the principle
that a court will read a statute "'as a whole and interpret its provisions in harmony with
other provisions.' A court will give meaning to the terms used in the statute 'so that no
part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant and so that one section will
not destroy another.'" (Id., 8 (citations omitted)). Also, he has looked to the doctrine of
ejusdem generis, legislative history, and case law. (/#., 8-19 (citations omitted)).
Under those tools, Jeffries maintains that the legislature contemplated that a counterfeit would be like a real drug (see id., 11-14) in more than appearance. The counterfeit
provisions target those who alter substances and present them for use as legitimate. (Id.)
That distinguishes counterfeits from imitation substances, which qualify as such based on
appearance. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3). Sheetrock chunks made to appear as
cocaine constitute an imitation. (Br. of Appellant, 18-19).
(1) The State's Argument Focuses on Counterfeits and Emphasizes Their
Dangers. Jeffries Does Not Deny the Dangers. To the Extent the Dangers
Distinguish a Counterfeit from an Imitation, Sheetrock Is an Imitation.
According to the State, actual drugs and counterfeits present real dangers. (Br. of
Appellee, 13-14; see also id., 30-31 (discussing the hierarchy of different offenses)).
4 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Indeed, a counterfeit may be as hazardous as an actual drug since it may contain impurities or a cheap substitute for a bona fide controlled substance, causing users to
miscalculate accurate dosage. See U.S. Food and Drug Admin., The Possible Dangers of
Buying Medicine Online, http://www.fda.gov/consumer/features/drugsonline0707.html
(stating counterfeits can be difficult to identify; counterfeiting applies to "brand name and
generic products" where substances are mislabeled to suggest authenticity, and dangers
include contamination, side effects, or the wrong active ingredient, among other things).
Moreover, under Utah law, counterfeit controlled substances may operate a fraud
on legitimate manufacturers or distributors. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(3)(a)(iv) (making it a crime for a counterfeiter to possess a "punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed" to mark or imprint a likeness on a drug for purposes of counterfeit).
In addition, both controlled substances and counterfeit substances are subjected to the
drug stamp tax act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-19-1021(1), 59-19-103(1) (2006) (defining
"[controlled substances" under the drug stamp tax act as "real or counterfeit" substances;
and imposing a tax on such substances under the act).
The dangers of counterfeits - as pointed out by the State (Br. of Appellee, 13-14)
- support that the legislature has treated counterfeits as bona fide illegal drugs because it
intended that a counterfeit bear more than a resemblance in appearance to a real drug.
Indeed, when considering the statutory provisions as a whole, the legislature
contemplated that counterfeits would be used as real drugs, and would present the same
harms to society. See, e.g.. Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1) (criminalizing conduct for
controlled or counterfeit substances without distinction), 59-19-102(1), 59-19-103(1)
5
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(taxing controlled and counterfeit substances without distinction). Thus, counterfeits and
authentic drugs are governed by the same provisions.
On the other hand, sheetrock chunks do not qualify as a "controlled substance" or
"counterfeit controlled substance." See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3) (defining
imitation substance) (emphasis added). Sheetrock is benign. However, it may resemble
drugs when packaged or presented as such. IcL (stating an imitation substance resembles
a specific controlled substance by overall dosage unit and appearance); see_ State v. Hill,
688 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 1984) (stating that exchanging baking soda for money is
distribution of an imitation substance).1 In addition, distributing sheetrock chunks as
cocaine is a step in drug trafficking. See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 2007 UT App 34, f 12,
157 P.3d 329 (reflecting that defendant's conduct fell within imitation provisions where

1

The State claims that when Hill was decided in 1984, a counterfeit substance was
"limited to those substances bearing" a false and unauthorized "trademark, trade name,"
marking, imprint or the like. (Br. of Appellee, 26). That is incorrect. In 1984, the
definition for a counterfeit was contained in a single provision but involved two parts.
The first part of the definition for counterfeit dealt with substances bearing false and
unauthorized markings, and the second part of the definition dealt with substances
"represented" to be controlled. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(23) (Supp. 1983).
In addition, in 1984 a substance constituted an imitation if it was represented as
such, or if it i(resemble[d] a specific controlled substance in appearance." Hill, 688 P.2d
at 451 (emphasis added). In its discussion about Hill, the State ignores the emphasized
language of the definition for imitation substances. (See Br. of Appellee, 26 (stating in
Hill, the definition for imitation relied on "representations made")). However, the court
in Hill considered it pertinent. It looked to both parts of the definition for an imitation to
rule that baking soda is an imitation. Hill, 688 P.2d at 452 (stating "baking soda
sufficiently resembled cocaine so that combined with defendant's representations that it
was 'good' cocaine, it was an imitation controlled substance") (emphasis added).
Today, the Imitation Controlled Substances Act continues to define an imitation as
a substance resembling a controlled substance. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37b-2(3), 5837b-3(l) (2007) (stating an imitation resembles a controlled substance in appearance, or
based on statements). Thus, Hill continues to be pertinent and controlling authority.
6
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defendant told police he removed pesticide from a shed in his backyard and packaged it
in a plastic bag because he intended to trick his next thief into stealing pesticide, and
police testified that pesticide resembled methamphetamine where small plastic bag was
the typical method for packaging methamphetamine).2 In that regard, the legislature has
penalized trafficking as a misdemeanor offense. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37b-4; 5837b-6; 58-37b-7 (2007) (criminalizing all aspects of trafficking in imitation substances,
including manufacturing, distributing, possessing, using, advertising and soliciting).
Notably, the legislature has not subjected imitation substances - or sheetrock chunks - to
a stamp tax. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-19-102(1), 59-19-103(1).
In short, distribution of a controlled substance or a counterfeit controlled substance
is punishable as a felony offense: the crimes are indistinguishable. Utah Code Ann. §5837-2(1). Based on the plain reading of those provisions, the legislature intended that a
counterfeit would mislead those using drugs - including consumers - into believing the
substance is bona fide. That is a danger that warrants treating counterfeit drugs as
controlled substances. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1), 59-19-102(1), 59-192

Jeffries relied on Nelson in the opening brief to show application of the imitation
provisions. (Br. of Appellant, 15). The State has mistakenly claimed that Jeffries cited to
it for more than that. (See Br. of Appellee, 29 (claiming Jeffries cited Nelson for more)).
In addition, in discussing Nelson, the State seems to suggest that the defendant
there could have been charged with a felony under the counterfeit provisions, but escaped
that fate because he did not indicate "the specific narcotic he was attempting to mimic"
with his pesticide. (Br. of Appellee, 32). According to the State's argument, if the
defendant had indicated that the pesticide was intended to resemble a "specific narcotic,"
the prosecutor may have proceeded with the case as a felony counterfeit. (Id.) The
State's argument ignores the plain language of the Imitation Controlled Substances Act.
According to the Act, if a substance "resembles a specific controlled substance" in
appearance, the substance is an imitation. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3). Thus,
resemblance to a "specific" narcotic falls squarely within the definition of imitation.
7 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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103(1). Also, the legislature intended that a counterfeit bear more than a resemblance to
a controlled substance. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3) (recognizing that a
substance is an imitation if it bears a resemblance to a controlled substance).
On the other hand, an imitation is not a controlled or a counterfeit controlled substance. hL It merely resembles a controlled substance, but otherwise does not present the
same dangers as a bona fide or counterfeit drug. Sheetrock is an imitation substance. It
is benign. However, distribution of sheetrock as cocaine is not benign: it encourages
distribution. Thus, distribution of an imitation is a misdemeanor offense. Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37b-4. These distinctions are supported by the plain language of the statutes,
the doctrine of ejusdem generis, legislative history, and case law. (See Br. of Appellant,
6-17). They ensure that terms in the statutory provisions are used advisedly, and are not
confusing, inoperable, contradictory, or superfluous; and they consider the statutory provisions as a whole and in harmony with other provisions to avoid absurd results. (See id.)
(2) Contrary to the State's Claims, this Court May Rely on the Doctrine of
Ejusdem Generis and Legislative History to Construe the Statutory Terms Here.
While the State has cited to the principles of statutory construction in its brief, it
has rejected the doctrine of ejusdem generis and legislative history in its analysis. (See
Br. of Appellee, 8, 19). According to the State, those doctrines apply only if the statutory
language at issue is ambiguous or confusing. (See id., 19).
In addition, the State claims "if the legislature had intended the second definition
of 'counterfeit substance' to reach only substances" in a class similar to those enumerated
in the first part of the definition, it could have imported the "necessary language from the

8
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first definition." (Br. of Appellee, 23). The State's argument on that point is irrelevant.
The canons of statutory construction already support that the legislature intended "the
second definition of 'counterfeit substance' to reach" (UL) only substances in a class
similar to those identified in the first definition. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court recently
relied on ejusdem generis as a primary tool of construction to rule that a general term is
"understood as restricted to include things of the same kind, class, character, or nature as
those specifically enumerated, unless there is something to show a contrary intent." See
In re Questar Gas Co., 2007 UT 79, Tj 15, 175 P.3d 545. Likewise, this Court relied on
legislative history to support its plain reading of a statute. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Shores, 2006 UT App 393, 147 P.3d 456. Those cases govern here.
(a) The Utah Supreme Court has relied on ejusdem generis as a primary tool in
statutory construction.
In Questar Gas Co., petitioners sought to intervene in proceedings relating to
Questar's application to recover costs for operating a carbon dioxide processing plant.
See 2007 UT 79, ff 1, 18. When their applications were rejected, they sought review in
the Utah Supreme Court. See, e.g., id. at ^[21-23. The court ascertained whether the
petitioners had standing to appeal. IcL at ^f| 44-45. It looked to a statute that allowed
standing if an individual was an aggrieved or prejudiced "party, stockholder, bondholder,
or other person pecuniarily interested in the public utility." I± at \ 49. Some of the
petitioners in Questar were ratepayers. See id_ at ^fl[ 50-53. Thus, according to the court,
the ratepayers' standing relied on interpreting the general phrase: other person
"pecuniarily interested in the public utility." Id. at f 51.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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The court looked primarily to the doctrine of ejusdem generis to rule that a general
term is "understood as restricted to include things of the same kind, class, character, or
nature as those specifically enumerated, unless there is something to show a contrary
intent." IcL at % 54. Based on that doctrine, it held that the catchall provision did not
allow the ratepayers/petitioners to intervene in Questar's proceedings. IcL
Under Questar Gas Co., the doctrine of ejusdem generis is consistent with the
primary goals of statutory construction. The doctrine takes the plain language of a statute
into consideration, it gives credence to the terms the legislature has used, it strives to
bring general catchall language in harmony with related provisions, and it tailors
statutory language to ensure that no other provisions are nullified, destroyed, or rendered
superfluous or insignificant. See ici at ^f 54 (looking to the statute as a whole and ruling
that it would be "nonsensical" to interpret the provision as requested by petitioners); see
also Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 62-63 (2004)
(recognizing that the Administrative Procedure Act places restrictions on judicial review
of "agency action" as set forth in a list of discretely circumscribed situations, and stating
that where the last item in the list contained broad language, "the interpretive canon of
ejusdem generis" would attribute to that item the "same characteristic of discreteness
shared by all the preceding items"); Black's Law Dictionary, 556 (8th ed. 2004) (stating
ejusdem generis is a canon of construction that interprets a general phrase or word so that
it includes "only items of the same type as those listed").
In this case, ejusdem generis gives meaning to the second part of the definition for
"[counterfeit substance." See. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(i) (defining counterfeit in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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two parts). Where the first part of the definition defines counterfeit as a substance that
bears a false and unauthorized label, trade name, or the like from a manufacturer, distributor or dispenser and contemplates use by consumers (Utah Code Ann. § 58-372(l)(i)(i)), the second provision should be construed similarly. It may be interpreted to
include any substance "of the same kind, class, character, or nature" as those enumerated
beforehand. Questar Gas Co., 2007 UT 79, ^ 54. It should be interpreted to apply to
any substance falsely represented to come from a manufacturer, distributor or dispenser,
even if the substance does not bear an identifying mark or the like. See_ Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-2(l)(i); (Br. of Appellant, 8-13). The provisions contemplate that consumers
will use counterfeits, and the substance will bear more than a resemblance to real drugs.
(b) This Court has looked to legislative history and debates for plain language.
Next, legislative history is relevant in considering the plain language of a statute.
In Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shores, 2006 UT App 393, this Court looked to such history to
confirm its plain reading analysis. In that case, Mr. and Mrs. Shores purchased a policy
from Liberty Mutual for accident coverage. IcL at ^ 5. The policy provided "liability
coverage" of $ 100,000 per person for bodily injury, and it contained an exclusion
referred to as a "step-down" provision. Id, According to the step-down provision, the
policy would not provide "liability coverage" for injury suffered by one household
member due to the negligence of another household member. Id, at | | 1, 5. Instead, the
injured party would be allowed to recover only the minimum amount under the law. See
id_ at f 5 & n.4 (reflecting minimum amount at $25,000).
In September 2003, the Shoreses were involved in an accident, and Mrs. Shores
11
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made a personal injury claim for $100,000 against the policy for Mr. Shores's negligence.
Id. at Yf 6-7. The insurance company refused to pay the amount and filed a declaratory
action to limit Mrs. Shores's damages to $25,000 under the step-down provision. IcL at
Tflf 7-8. Mrs. Shores responded by claiming, among other things, that the step-down
provision was ambiguous, and it violated Utah law and public policy. IcL at ^fl[ 9, 15.
The trial court rejected the Shoreses' arguments and granted summary judgment for the
insurance company, and the Shoreses appealed. Id. at^j 11-14.
In considering the matter, this Court declined to address whether the provision was
ambiguous, and instead addressed the step-down clause under the law. IcL at \ 15. It
looked to a later enacted statute, which "expressly prohibited" step-down provisions. IcL
at Tj 17. Also, it relied on legislative history and debates to support its "plain language
reading." I(L at ^ 19. Specifically, the legislature indicated in 1999 that insurance
companies may not reduce coverage amounts for persons injured due to the negligence of
someone living in the home. IcL at ^[ 19-20. Then in 2005, the legislature amended the
law dealing with reduced coverage and it enacted a new provision prohibiting step-down
coverage. IcL at H 21. According to the legislative debates, the legislative alterations
clarified existing law since the legislature intended that the earlier law would prevent
step-down provisions. IcL at ^f 21. The debates and amendments made the plain reading
"absolutely clear." I± at \ 21 & n.6.
In the context of this case, the legislative history of the Controlled Substances Act
and the Imitation Controlled Substances Act supports that the legislature did not amend
the provisions to expand the definition for counterfeit substances beyond the original
12
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1986 definition. Specifically, as stated in the opening brief (see Br. of Appellant, 13), in
1986, the definition for a "[counterfeit substance" was as follows:
[A]ny controlled substance or container or labeling of any controlled substance
that, without authorization bears the trademark, trade name, or other identifying
mark, imprint, number, or device or any likeness thereof, of a manufacturer,
distributor, or dispenser other than the person or persons who in fact
manufactured, distributed, or dispensed the substance which thereby falsely
purports or is represented to be the product of, or to have been distributed by,
such other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(23) (Supp. 1983) (emphasis added). According to the
legislation, a counterfeit was a substance that was falsely purported to be a controlled
substance bearing an unauthorized trademark, trade name, identifying mark or the like
from a manufacturer, distributor or dispenser; and it was a substance that was falsely
"represented to be" the product of a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser. Id.
In 1987, while the legislature amended the statute and reorganized the definition
for counterfeit into parts (i) and (ii), it did not intend to alter the original meaning. (See
R. 94; 103; 112); see also Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1 )(i). It intended to clarify the
definition in order to avoid duplication between the counterfeit provisions and the
imitation provisions. (R. 103; 112).
Pursuant to Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., this Court may look to the legislative history to
confirm a plain-reading analysis that a counterfeit is a substance falsely purporting to be a
controlled substance and bearing a mark, name or imprint without authorization from a
manufacturer, distributor or dispenser; and a substance falsely "represented to be" from a
manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2 (1986 & 2007). In
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addition, the legislature enacted later amendments to avoid duplication with the imitation
provisions, not to change the definition of a counterfeit. (R. 103; 112).
(c) To the extent this Court may apply ejusdem generis and legislative history only
when a statute is ambiguous, the State has provided ambiguity in its argument.
Finally, in the event this Court determines that it may consider legislative history
and the doctrine of ejusdem generis only if a provision is ambiguous, in this case, the
State's analysis provides that ambiguity. Specifically, the State has argued that the
counterfeit provisions are so broad as to ensnare "any substance that is described,
presented, or put forth - either by words or conduct - as a controlled substance." (Br. of
Appellee, 11). The State's expansive definition necessarily includes every substance that
is falsely purported to be a controlled substance and contains unauthorized labels,
markings, imprints, or the like from a manufacturer, distributor or dispenser. But see
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(i) (providing a definition for counterfeit that covers
unauthorized labeling, marking, imprinting and the like). Indeed, it goes without saying
that false and unauthorized labeling qualifies as "presenting], or put[ting] forth" a
substance through "conduct." (Br. of Appellee, 11 (construing second part of definition
for counterfeit)). Thus, the State's interpretation serves to nullify the first part of the
definition for counterfeit substances.

3

The State attempts to distinguish the first definition for counterfeit from the
second definition by claiming the definitions represent different burdens of proof for the
State. (See Br. of Appellee, 17). That is nonsensical. The State's burden in a criminal
case is always proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, ^ 11,
116 P.3d 305. In addition, the State later asserts that for a conviction under the
counterfeit provisions, it is required to establish "(1) that defendant (2) knowingly and
intentionally (3) distributed (4) a counterfeit controlled substance." (Br. of Appellee, 35Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In addition, the State's broad interpretation necessarily includes every substance
that is "presented, or put forth" through "conduct," such as packaging to resemble a
specific controlled substance in terms of overall dosage unit and appearance. (Br. of
Appellee, 11); but see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3) (defining an imitation substance as
resembling a specific controlled substance by overall dosage unit and appearance). The
State's interpretation for counterfeit under the second part of the definition renders the
Imitation Controlled Substances Act meaningless. Indeed, the State's expansive
interpretation offers no real distinction between a counterfeit and imitation, thereby
creating ambiguity and confusion as to when the different provisions apply. See, e.g.,
Ko lender v. Laws on, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (recognizing that legislature must provide
minimal guidelines to law enforcement) (citation omitted); Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263
(stating "criminal laws must be written so that there are significant differences between
offenses and so that the exact same conduct is not subject to different penalties"
depending on the prosecutor's predilections); Shondel, 453 P.2d at 148 (recognizing that
statutes must be clear, specific, and understandable as to which provision applies in given
circumstances). Thus, where the State's argument supports ambiguity, this Court may
rely on the doctrine of ejusdem generis and legislative history to construe the statutory
terms. (Br. of Appellant, 8-14 (relying on ejusdem generis and legislative history)).
36). The first part of the definition for counterfeit requires proof that defendant falsely
purported the substance to be authentic, and he presented it with a trademark, trade name,
imprint or the like without authorization from a manufacturer, distributor or dispenser.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(i). The second part of the definition requires proof that
defendant "represented" it "to be a controlled substance." Id, Contrary to the State's
claims, the burden is not "easier" for a felony conviction under one part or the other.
(See Br. of Appellee, 17).
15
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B. THE SHONDEL DOCTRINE SUPPORTS PROCEEDING WITH THIS
CASE UNDER THE MISDEMEANOR PROVISIONS.
In the alternative, in the event the counterfeit provisions may be construed to apply
broadly to any substance that is presented to resemble a specific controlled substance by
dosage unit and appearance (see, e.g., Br. of Appellee, 11 (defining counterfeit)), those
provisions are indistinguishable from the provisions dealing with imitation substances.
(See Br. of Appellant, Argument B.); Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3) (defining imitation).
The State acknowledges that for an offense under both the counterfeit provisions
and the imitation provisions, the pertinent elements are as follows: (1) that defendant (2)
intentionally and knowingly4 (3) distributed (4) a "substance" as a "controlled
substance." (Br. of Appellee, 35-36). For a counterfeit, the State claims that element (4)
requires "proof that the substance was represented to be a controlled substance." (Id., 36
(citing Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(i))). Also, the State asserts that phrase is interpreted
according to its "ordinary meaning" and includes "any substance that is described,

4

The State asserts that distribution of an imitation substance may be done "recklessly," and cites to general language at Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (West 2004). (Br. of
Appellee, 36 & n. 2). Yet reliance on that general provision is misplaced: Utah courts
have ruled that specific statutory provisions govern over general provisions. See, e.g.,
Pugh v. Draper City, 2005 UT 12, ^ 10, 114 P.3d 546 (stating "the provision more specific in application governs over the more general provision") (citation omitted); State v.
Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The specific language of the Imitation
Controlled Substances Act defines "[distribute" to mean actual, constructive, or
attempted delivery. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(2). It does not include "recklessly" as a
proper mental state for that offense, hi In addition, under Utah law, actual, constructive,
or attempted conduct is always intentional and knowing conduct. See State v. Casey,
2003 UT 55, % 12, 82 P.3d 1106 (stating attempt requires proof of intent); State v.
Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 787 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (stating constructive conduct requires
proof of ability and intent), affd, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 911; State v. Echevarrieta, 621
P.2d 709, 712 (Utah 1981) (stating actual knowledge is constructive knowledge).
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presented, or put forth - either by words or conduct - as a controlled substance." (Br. of
Appellee, 11). For an imitation, the law requires proof of a substance, "which by overall
dosage unit substantially resembles a specific controlled substance in appearance,
including its color, shape, or size." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3).
The State claims there are discernible differences between the counterfeit provisions and the imitation provisions at element (4). (Br. of Appellee, 36-37). However, it
fails to explain those differences. (Id.) Instead, it claims that the counterfeit provisions,
as it has construed them, contain "expansive language." (Id, 27). Based on the State's
interpretation, a substance that is "presented or put forth" by conduct - including in the
way of appearance resembling a specific controlled substance - is a counterfeit. (See id.,
11 (defining a counterfeit)). Yet such a substance is also an imitation. See Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37b-2(3) (defining an imitation). In that regard, to the extent the State has
offered any distinction between the elements, it is a distinction without a difference.
Moreover, the State relies on the fact that the statute defining an imitation states
that an imitation is not a "counterfeit controlled substance." (Br. of Appellee, 36-37
(citing Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3))). The State does not attempt to explain what that
means. (Id.) It asserts simply that an imitation cannot be a counterfeit. (Id) Yet in
practice, the statute merely leaves it to the prosecutor to decide how to classify a
simulated substance. Specifically, if a prosecutor chooses to classify it as a "counterfeit"
- because it was "put forth" through "conduct" (Br. of Appellee, 1 1 ) , / ^ packaging in
dosage unit to resemble a controlled substance - the case will proceed under the felony
provisions. If the prosecutor chooses to classify it as an imitation - because it was put
17
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forth through conduct, le^ packaging in "dosage unit" to "resemble[] a specific controlled
substance" (Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3)) - the case will proceed under the imitation
provisions. Without proper guidelines, prosecutors are allowed "to pursue their personal
predilections," Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (citation omitted), in classifying the substances
for purposes of felony or misdemeanor proceedings.
In that regard, the counterfeit and imitation provisions fail to contain "significant
differences between offenses and so that the exact same conduct is not subject to different
penalties depending upon which of two statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to
charge." Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263. They raise "doubt or uncertainty as to which of two
punishments is applicable to an offense." ShondeL 453 P.2d at 148. The statutes allow "a
form of arbitrariness that is foreign to our system of law. The Legislature may make
automobile homicide which is committed recklessly either a misdemeanor or a felony,
but it cannot make the crime both a felony and a misdemeanor, leaving the choice to the
prosecutor as to whether he charges a felony or misdemeanor." Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263.
Next, the State takes Jeffries to task because he has argued that under the law, a
substance may be classified as an imitation based on statements concerning the nature of
the substance, its use or effect. (See Br. of Appellee, 39 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 5837b-3(l))). The State suggests that Jeffries has relied on factors that a jury may consider
in the analysis, rather than a definition for "imitation," which is an element of the offense.
(Id.) According to the State, factors are inappropriate because "[t]he Shondel doctrine
limits its inquiry to the elements of the criminal statutes which the defendant claims
overlap and applies only when 'two statutes are wholly duplicative as to the elements of
18
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the crime.'" (Id, (citing State v. Williams, 2007 UT 98, If 14, 175 P.3d 1029)).
The State's argument is misplaced. Under the provisions governing imitation
controlled substances, the legislature has defined an imitation as a substance that
resembles a controlled substance by overall dosage unit and appearance. Utah Code Ann,
§ 58-37b-2(3). In addition, the legislature has provided an alternative definition for that
element. It has specified that if appearance is insufficient to establish that a substance is
an imitation, the fact-finder may consider statements concerning the nature of the
substance, its use or effect. Id_ at § 58-37b-3(l). The legislature has offered alternative
definitions for the element of imitation. Thus, the offense may be established with proof
(1) that defendant (2) intentionally and knowingly (3) distributed (4) a substance
resembling a controlled substance based on statements concerning its nature, use, effect
or similarity to a controlled substance. Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37b-3(l); 58-37b-4. That
offense is indistinguishable from the State's statutory elements for distribution of a
counterfeit substance: (1) that defendant (2) intentionally and knowingly (3) distributed
(4) a substance that is represented to be a controlled substance. (Br. of Appellee, 35-36).
Finally, the State does not dispute that the counterfeit provisions and imitation
provisions are indistinguishable where the State may prove element (4) with reference to
false labeling and packaging represented to be a controlled substance. See Utah Code
Ann. §§ 58-37-2(l)(i) (defining counterfeit substance based on representations), 5 8-3 7b3(3) (defining imitation substance with reference to packaging or labeling "in a manner
similar to that generally used for controlled substances"); (see also Br. of Appellee,
Argument D (no dispute regarding identical nature of those elements)). In that instance,
19
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the elements for the felony offense or the misdemeanor offense are as follows: (1) that
defendant (2) intentionally and knowingly (3) distributed (4) a substance represented to
be a controlled substance based on packaging or labeling. Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-372(l)(i)(ii), 58-37-8(1) (elements for counterfeit); Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37b-3(3), 5837b-4 (elements for imitation). In this case, the offense relied on the packaging: it
resembled a specific controlled substance in appearance. (See Br. of Appellee, 3); (R.
58-59). According to the State's evidence, Jeffries made no representation concerning
the substance. (R. 57-59). Rather he provided a package that resembled "crack cocaine
the way it was packaged," it had the "likeness" of cocaine. (Id.) Under the Shondel
doctrine, Jeffries was entitled to have this case proceed under the misdemeanor
provisions. Shondel 453 P.2d at 148 (stating "where there is doubt," defendant is
entitled to proceed under the lesser); State v. Loveless, 581 P.2d 575, 576-77 (Utah 1978)
(recognizing that when two statutes proscribe the same conduct but impose different
penalties, defendant is entitled to proceed under the lesser).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein and in the Brief of Appellant, Jeffries respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the felony charge and remand
this case for further proceedings under the misdemeanor provisions.
SUBMITTED this 24 day of November, 2008.
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